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PATENTS ON LEGAL METHODS? NO WAY!
Andrew A. Schwartz*
In 2003, for the first time in its 170-year history, the United States
Patent Office began awarding patents for legal methods, such as tax
strategies, in addition to traditional inventions such as Tylenol or the
telephone. Commentators-including the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the General Counsel of the Patent Office, and the Chair of the
ABA Intellectual Property Law Section-have accepted the Patent
Office's power to grant legal method patents (as a type of business
method, which were ruled patentable by the federal courts in 1998), but
at the same time have criticized this new type of patent on policy
grounds.
The policy concerns surrounding legal method patents are
significant. Although the patent system is designed to prevent latecomers
from "free riding" on another's invention, thus reducing the incentive
to invent in the first place, the public has always been actively
encouraged to free ride on legal developments. Indeed, that is the whole
point of legal precedent: to establish rules of law that all must obey.
There is something deeply disturbing about granting a private
citizen a monopoly, enforceable by the courts, over a method of
complying with the tax code or, for that matter, any other law. Moreover,
no attorney wants to pause before advising a client in order to run a
patent search to make sure that no one owns the advice she is about to
give. And what client wants to pay extra to his or her lawyer to cover
licensing fees?
Although granting patents to tax strategies has been a subject of
policy debate, noticeably absent from this discussion has been any
consideration of whether legal methods, including tax strategies, are
patentable in the first place. At a recent hearing of a House Ways and
Means Subcommittee on "issues relating to the patenting of tax advice,"
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for example, not one of the witnesses questioned the patentability of tax
strategies.
So, before fretting too much over the potentially dire consequences
of private citizens or corporations owning patents for legal methods, it
pays to stop and consider whether such patents are valid at all. As 150
years of consistent Supreme Court precedent make plain, they are not.
In passing the Patent Act, Congress established certain
requirements for patentability, including the requirement that only
"inventions" may be patented. What is an invention? The definition
provided in the Patent Act-"The term 'invention' means invention or
discovery"-is not helpful. In fact, a leading legal dictionary's entry for
invention describes it as a "word impossible of definition. "
The Supreme Court, however, has not shied away from this
challenge, and has offered a clear and workable definition of the term:
An invention is anything made by man that employs or harnesses a law of
nature or a naturally occurring substance for human benefit. A
watermill, for instance, harnesses the power of gravity to run machinery.
An airplane exploits certain laws of fluid dynamics to achieve lift. A
pharmaceutical combines elements and molecules to heal diseases.
The Supreme Court's definition of invention dates back at least to
the Telephone Cases of 1888, which upheld Alexander Graham Bell's
patent on the telephone on the ground that "electricity, one of the
forces of nature, is employed; but electricity, left to itself, will not do
what is wanted. The [invention] consists in controlling the force as to
make it accomplish the purpose" of transmitting messages across long
distances. The High Court has since reiterated this definition on
numerous occasions in the twentieth century. "If there is to be
invention," wrote the Court in 1948, 1972 and again in 1981, "it must
come from the application of [a] law of nature to a new and useful end."
This understanding of the term invention has also achieved
acceptance around the world. The few patent systems that define
invention by statute have adopted this construction. The Japanese Patent
Law defines invention as "a highly advanced creation of a technical idea
making use of a law of nature," and South Korea's patent statute uses
nearly identical language. Continental Europe is in accord, led by the
influential German legal philosopher Josef Kohler, who explicated this
understanding in the early twentieth century.
But legal methods are not inventions in this sense, because they
employ "laws of man"-not laws of nature-to produce a useful result.
All legal methods necessarily depend on the existence of a certain legal
regime to achieve their objective.
A tax strategy, for instance, depends upon provisions of the Internal
I The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 532 (1888).
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Revenue Code to minimize tax liability. The "poison pill" (which sprang
from the imagination of my colleague, Martin Lipton, in the early 1980s)
employs certain features of state corporate law to maximize shareholder
value in the face of a hostile takeover. The poison pill is a useful
innovation, to be sure, but it is not an invention within the meaning of
the Patent Act and, hence, is not patentable.
So where do we go from here? The first step is for the Patent Office
to inend its ways and stop awarding patents for tax strategies. The second
is for the Office to reexamine and invalidate the patents that have been
granted. Innovation is a great thing, but clearly in this instance the
Office has gone too far.
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